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Abstract
Evidence of spatial dependence in land use regulatory levels was first found in Brueck-
ner (1998) for California cities. Recent research has not incorporated this consideration
despite the considerable consequences of the relationship. We seek to expand the em-
pirical findings to a current, larger and more diverse data set for municipalities across
the United States. Analyzing regulatory levels and their determinants from over 2,000
municipalities and 300 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, we find strong evidence of spa-
tial dependence at the local level and aggregated metropolitan level. This suggests that
political competition, rather than welfare maximization exclusively, may be influencing
the level of regulations adopted.
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1 Introduction
The motivation and consequences of land use regulation have been extensively studied in
the literature.1 The cause of variation in levels of land use regulation can be divided into
two categories: regulation as a result of geographic considerations and regulation resulting
from community preferences. The influence of geography on the level of regulation arises via
safety concern justifications. Geographic considerations may make some areas uninhabitable
and regulation against building or expanding in these areas is consistent with stylized facts.
Regions that are particularly mountainous, close to water or have other natural boundaries
tend to have high levels of regulation (Saiz, 2010).
In this analysis, our focus is on the community preference explanation of land use reg-
ulation. Two types of individuals are usually assumed to be affected by regulation levels,
homeowners and renters/businesses. The most popular theory for the adoption of, and
increase in, land use regulation is the desire of existing homeowners to maximize their hous-
ing values through increased levels of regulation (Fischel, 2001). This desire on the part
of homeowners may come from a preference for wealth maximization and/or a preference
for avoidance of low-income residents, or “snob zoning” (Ihlanfeldt, 2004). This preference
arises from the recognition that income disparities place the tax burden more heavily on the
relatively wealthy.
However, high regulation levels in surrounding areas may also have a negative spillover
effect. When one area engages in snob zoning, the surrounding areas may see an influx of
lower income households. This will increase the demand for lower priced homes and increase
the tax burden of the relatively high income households. Under this line of reasoning we may
see a “regulation arms race” as politicians compete for the votes of the current residents. At
the same time, regulation adds a cost to housing development, which is passed on to renters
and businesses (which rent commercial property). A regulatory arms race may result in a
costly, higher-than-optimal level of regulation without reducing the proportion of low income
1See Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) for a review of land use regulation research.
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households (since both areas now have high levels).
On the flip side, if one area reduces the regulation levels, renters and businesses may
choose to locate in that jurisdiction rather than in the relatively high regulatory surrounding
jurisdictions. Politicians who want to maximize their votes by increasing economic growth
may wish to have relatively low regulation levels. When politicians start to compete on this
margin we may observe a “race to the bottom” as jurisdictions try to have lower levels of
regulations than their neighbors. The resulting regulatory levels will be low in both areas,
perhaps hurting homeowners through lower house prices, but no renters or new businesses
will relocate (since both areas now have low levels). Both of these possible outcomes, a
regulation arms race or a race to the bottom, are dependent on the assumption that the
level of regulation in one area is positively related to the level of regulation in surrounding
areas.
Although the early work of Brueckner (1998) modeled the possibility of spatial depen-
dence between California cities, recent work has not accounted for this possible relationship.
In addition to testing for a shared spatial dependence with recent data, we extend the previ-
ous analysis in several ways. We employ a more diverse data set of over 2,000 observations
relative to his 173 observations, we test for dependence at the smaller municipalities level
and the larger metropolitan area and we also use an alternative method of geographic con-
straints. These extensions allow our results to be generalized to more communities than
previous findings.
We find that after accounting for shared regional influences, regulatory levels are sig-
nificantly influenced by the regulatory levels in surrounding communities, evidenced by a
positive and significant spatial dependence coefficient. This relationship holds at the local
level and at the larger Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level. It is likely that polit-
ical concerns are playing an influential role. Politicians recognize that their constituents
observe the economic and political climate in surrounding areas to form an opinion about
their political leaders. If citizens prefer policies in surrounding jurisdictions rather than
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current policies, they will punish their elected policymakers. This may be done at the polls
or by “voting with their feet” and relocating to neighboring areas (Tiebout, 1956). Conse-
quently, politicians concerned with re-election will account for the circumstances, including
regulation levels, in surrounding areas when formulating and enacting policies. This finding
suggests that analysis estimating the determinants of regulatory levels should account for
this relationship to avoid biasing the effects of other influential factors.
2 Literature Review
There are several theories regarding demand side influences of regulatory levels. These in-
clude the negative externality argument, exclusionary and fiscal motivations, and the political
influence hypothesis (described below). Our interest lies in the intersection of exclusionary
zoning and political forces, although we attempt to control for other determinants, discussed
in Section ??.
Since the U.S. Department of Commerce first allowed local governments to impose regu-
lations in 1926, many regulations have been enacted to improve social welfare in the presence
of negative externalities (McDonald and McMillen, 1998). Communities may opt to zone
residential areas separate from commercial areas when businesses emit noise, air and other
types of pollutants. This separation benefits homeowners, who want to avoid these pollu-
tants, and businesses, who are given more platitude when separated from residential areas.
Further restrictions on development may be warranted on welfare-maximizing grounds for
particularly harmful construction or business practices.
As urban areas develop, density may create its own negative externality in the form of
congestion and ongoing construction. In this case regulation which limits growth may be
desirable. Delaying growth, rather than limiting growth, may also be welfare improving if
the externality cost of construction is sufficiently high. However, imposed corrections for
market externalities, like regulation, carry the traditional risk of creating more inefficiencies
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than the remedy solves (Jr., 1987; Nelson, 1989). Land use regulation which restricts use
of private property may reduce private land use efficiency to a greater extent than any
realized gains from negative externality reductions (Ellickson, 1973; Siegan, 1977; Nelson,
1980; Fischel, 1987; Kmiec, 1981). Early alternative proposals, described by Ottensmann
(1998), range from private contracts (Nelson, 1980), sellable zoning entitlements (Fischel,
1987), or nuisance laws (Siegan, 1977). We consider the influence of negative externalities
generated by growth on regulatory levels by including a measure for growth.
In addition to correcting for negative externalities, regulation can designed to reduce
the supply of new residents, referred to as “exclusionary zoning”. Historically, this type
of regulation allowed codified discrimination to occur as neighborhoods sought to prevent
blacks, immigrants and other minorities from living in particular neighborhoods (Danielson,
1976). More recently, zoning may act to discourage low-income inhabitants (Ihlanfeldt, 2004)
from residing in particular areas, sometimes referred to as “snob zoning”. This may be
done through regulatory measures which increase the cost of construction and consequently
housing, to the point that low-income households cannot afford to live in these jurisdictions.
Although this may reflect a preference for living apart from the poor, demand for zoning on
this basis also has influential tax consequences. Publicly provided goods, such as education,
are funded by property taxes. These taxes are proportional to the value of the house and
as a result, large inequalities in housing values will place the tax burden for these goods
disproportionately on the relatively rich.
In addition to the exclusionary aspect, zoning designed to discourage low-income house-
holds may have spillover effects to neighboring jurisdictions. Migration be prohibitively
costly for low income households. Interstate migration patterns suggest that less educated,
low income households move less than their more educated, richer counterparts (Kennan and
Walker, 2011). If low income households are driven out of, or prevented from migrating into,
a particular jurisdiction, neighboring jurisdictions will house larger numbers of low-income
households. Given the cost associated with low-income housing, these jurisdictions may
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respond with similar regulations. Since the poor will likely reside in the general area, the
end result is higher regulation levels for all jurisdictions, but no change in the proportion of
low-income residents in any particular jurisdiction. Although our analysis is constrained to
testing for the presence of spatial dependence, this welfare-reducing possibility is an impor-
tant consideration of our findings.
Fiscally, demand for regulation may exist on the grounds of property value maximization.
Homeowners desire to maximize wealth, of which housing equity is a significant component,
and petition politicians to enact regulation which increases housing values (Fischel, 2001).
Land use regulation is thought to reduce the supply of housing and increase the cost of
new construction, both of which act to increase housing values (Ihlanfeldt, 2007; Zabel and
Dalton, 2011; Glaeser et al., 2005). The magnitude of this effect is difficult to establish and
the methods for extracting the effect of regulation on housing prices are not settled in the
literature. A common technique is to estimate the portion of housing value increases over
time that is not explained by other factors (income growth, population growth, etc). Glaeser
and Gyourko (2002) estimated the effects of zoning on land values in forty cities and found
price effects as high as $200,000 over time. Eicher (2008) extended a similar analysis to 250
cities and found that high regulatory levels have a stronger influence on house prices than
income and population growth.
Ihlanfeldt (2007) details several issues with the literature (first described by Quigley
and Rosenthal (2005)). The first is that it appears that housing prices, though treated as
exogenous when examining the relationship between house price and regulatory levels, are
likely endogenous. Additionally, regulatory environments are usually measured through an
summary index, which may be “weak and indirect”. Furthermore, Quigley and Rosenthal
(2005) expresses skepticism that the reliance on survey data from homeowners for a measure
of house prices is appropriate. Ihlanfeldt (2007) considers these issues in his analysis of the
influence of land use regulation on house prices. He finds that a strong relationship between
house price and land use regulation persists even after using data sets which avoid the
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pitfalls described above. More recently, Zabel and Dalton (2011) also find strong evidence of
a positive influence of regulation on housing levels. Although our analysis does not rely on
the presence of this relationship, the belief of individuals that land use regulation increases
housing prices appears to be supported in the literature.
Regulation is often assumed to be determined by the potential and current residents
in that respective jurisdiction. However, formally, land use regulations are imposed by
political bodies and, consequently, may also be thought of as outcomes of a political in-
fluence. Theoretical models often pit renters and owners of undeveloped land, who would
like less regulation, against homeowners who desire increased levels of regulation (Fischel,
2001; Ortalo-Magne and Prat, 2007; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 2009). Increased levels of
regulation occur when homeowners have more political clout than owners of undeveloped
land and decreased levels of regulation when the reverse is true.
The majority of the land use regulation analysis assumes that local government officials
choose the level of regulation to maximize social welfare independent of the regulatory levels
of other jurisdictions.2 Public choice theory predicts that this may not be the case when the
short-run interests of politicians are in conflict with the long-run interests of constituents.
Politicians are assumed to maximize the chance of remaining in office by maximizing votes
received in the next election. If we assume voters are mobile within reasonable proximity
to current employment, politicians are now in competition for votes not only with the chal-
lenger, but also with politicians in neighboring jurisdictions. Consequently, politicians may
choose regulation levels that are influenced by the choice of regulation levels in neighboring
communities.
In many cases, this outcome is not in contrast with a social welfare maximization. How-
ever, the spatial interaction of political decisions can be an important determinant of regu-
lation levels in the presence of significantly large negative externalities. A regulation arms
race may ensue as an increase in regulation in a neighboring town can create a negative
2Notable exceptions include Brueckner (1998) and Nguyen (2009).
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externality as low-income households migrate to the less regulated neighboring community.
This increases the tax burden of the current residents and as a result, the residents desire in-
creased levels of regulation to deter further migration of low-income households. But unless
the town responds with an increase in regulation levels to such an extent that low-income
households migrate back to their original neighborhoods, the current residents are worse off
and the current residents in the neighboring community are better off. Politicians may be
blamed for the reduction in welfare and punished during re-election. As a result, politicians
may increase regulation levels in anticipation of neighboring areas increasing regulation.
This initial increase may not be welfare maximizing, both in the local neighborhood and on
a global scale as areas increase their absolute levels of regulation but not their relative levels.
If the consequence of land use regulation is only to increase housing prices and to deter
particular residents, we would expect to see high levels of regulation in every township. On
the contrary, there are many areas which have adopted very low levels of land use regulation,
implying that there may be costs to community of increasing regulation. Land use regulation
is a non revenue-generating tax that simply acts as a “shadow tax” on construction and
increases the cost of doing business (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2009; Sunding and Swoboda,
2010).
Owners of undeveloped land and potential businesses would prefer, ceteris paribus, low
levels of regulation and may exit or avoid communities where high levels of regulation are
adopted and consequently reduce economic growth potential. In densely populated and
growing areas, this additional cost may not have a large effect on the local economy, but
in stagnating and undeveloped communities, the cost may substantial in terms of economic
growth. Saks (2008) has observed such an effect, finding that areas with extremely high
levels of regulation do not experience as large of a benefit from increased demand relative to
areas with lower regulatory levels.
To our knowledge, Brueckner (1998) was the first to formally model spatial dependence
of regulatory levels. He empirically tests the hypothesis that regulation is influenced by
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the regulation levels in surrounding communities and finds evidence of significant spatial
dependence. He uses control variables at the city and county level in California and presents
the results as an outcome of a social welfare maximizing function with two agents, renters
and homeowners. These results prompt further research for several reasons. The first is that
California communities have some of the highest levels of land use regulation levels in the
country. Part of this trend is due to geographic considerations, which he controls for through
the use of a dummy variable indicating if the town borders the Pacific Ocean. Geographic
considerations are likely spatially correlated and it would be useful to see if there is spatial
correlation in areas that do not have such high levels of regulation. Quigley and Raphael
(2005) also note that California is unique with respect to the level of regulation permitted
at the city level, with resulting relatively high regulation relative to the rest of the country.
Secondly, our hypothesis is conditional on the assumption that individuals are mobile
between communities and this may not hold for larger cities and counties. We use a data
set that is disaggregated to the municipalities level rather than the city level. Third, and
most surprisingly, recent analysis has not allowed for the presence of spatial dependence
as an explanatory factor. Although political influences are described, these influences are
not empirically modeled to spill over into neighboring communities. It is useful to test
more recent conclusions of the determinants of land use regulation when allowing for spatial
dependence.
Finally, in addition to analyzing the spatial relationship at the local level, we test for
evidence of spatial spillovers of regulation levels at the aggregated Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) level. Black and Hoben (1985) first analyzed the relationship between house
prices and regulation at the metropolitan area. They developed an index for 30 MSAs and
report a negative correlation between regulation levels and developable lots; this is consistent
with the hypothesis that developed land with experience higher prices and undeveloped
land lower prices. In addition to the previously mentioned studies of Glaeser and Gyourko
(2002); Eicher (2008), Segal and Srinivasan (1985); Guidry et al. (1991); Malpezzi (1996)
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find evidence that house prices increase faster in highly regulated metropolitan areas while
Downs (2002) uses a larger, more recent, sample and finds the effect is not present for all
time periods. If developers and households account for cost of living considerations, of which
housing costs are a large component, relative regulatory levels may also be influential at the
MSA level.
Furthermore, there is evidence that areas with high levels of land use regulation may
develop into “superstar cities”. As modeled by Gyourko et al. (2006), cities that are not
necessarily more attractive and may not offer more amenities than similar, but less regulated
cities, may attract a disproportionately higher amount of high-income household residents.
Using MSA level data from 1970-2000, they find that superstar cities do have a higher fraction
of high-income families than their non-superstar counterparts. Consequently we may expect
that lower income households are out-bid and may migrate to neighboring MSA’s. As a
result we may observe that, for reasons similar to those at the local level, neighboring MSA’s
may adopt higher levels of regulation than they would have otherwise. Whether the level of
regulation in one MSA will have an effect on the level of regulation in a neighboring area
depends in part if there are negative externalities generated at such an aggregated level.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Methodology
Brueckner (1998) introduces a formal motivation of spatial dependence of regulatory levels
in an expanded model developed by Helsley and strange (1994), which was influenced by the
work of Brueckner (1990, 57); Engle et al. (1992). The model is comprised of two cities in
which the government chooses the level of regulation to maximize welfare and a third passive
city that absorbs the population not residing in the other two cities.3 The government of
3This passive city is used to ensure that the total population fits into the urban system. This assumption
is needed when it is assumed that land consumption is fixed and to generate a closed form solution.
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the two active cities chooses the level of regulation to maximize a weighted average of the
utilities of renters and absentee landowners.
The utility of landowners is assumed to be increasing and total land rents while the utility
of renters is assumed to be increasing in consumption and decreasing in the population.4
When city 1 increases its level of regulation, the city size is reduced as a portion of the
population migrates to city 2. This migration reduces the utility of renters in city 2 through
reduced consumption caused by higher land rents and congestion. Due to the fact that
utilities will be equalized across cities in urban equilibrium, the utility in city 1 will decrease
through a fall in consumption as a consequence of higher land rents.
In this model the impact that the government’s choice of regulation in city 1 has on the
utility of renters in city 1 is independent of the level of regulation chosen by city 2. However,
the impact of the choice of regulatory levels on landowners in city 1 is influenced by the
regulatory levels in city 2. As the government in city 1 increases regulation, reducing city
size, land rent is lost at the boundary of the city. This lost land rent in city 1 is lower than
the less regulated city 2 because land rents are lower throughout the entire urban system
the less regulated city 2 is. Therefore, the less regulation adopted by city 2, the less costly
is is for city 1 to increase regulation and consequently, city 1 will adopt higher levels of
regulation.
Due to the influence that surrounding cities regulatory levels have on landowners, the
model predicts an inverse spatial relationship between regulatory levels chosen (referred to
as “growth controls”). The solution yields a reaction function that implies a Nash equilib-
rium result that is inefficient relative to the outcome without regulatory growth controls.
Brueckner (1998) points out that if some assumptions are changed (such as allowing variable
land consumption) then the predicted spatial relationships can become positive over a range
of regulation choices.
Brueckner (1998) tests the model using data from survey results of 173 California cities
4The inverse relationship between utility and population reflects costs associated with congestion.
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and counties and finds significant evidence of spatial dependence. Similar to his empirical
estimation, we interpret the coefficient on the regulatory levels in nearby jurisdictions as
the slope of the reaction function. If this estimated coefficient is zero, there is no strategic
reaction with respect to regulatory levels. If the coefficient is non-zero and significant, this
confirms our hypothesis of spatial dependence. Brueckner (1998) concedes that his results
provide evidence of interaction, but do not prove that the particular mechanism, described
above, is the cause. Consequently, although our proposed explanation contributes another
potential mechanism of the source of spatial dependence, our primary concern is determining
the existence of spatial dependence.
The slope of the theoretical reaction function is considered by employing a spatial Durbin
model with regional fixed effects. This model incorporates a spatial lag component of the
dependent variable and of the independent variables for the surrounding neighbors. The
neighbors are determined by creating a weighted average of the specified number of nearest
neighbors5. The nearest neighbors are the jurisdictions who are closest in terms of linear
distance. The optimal number of nearest neighbors is fairly arbitrary, but is typically be-
tween five and twenty (Sedgley et al., 2008). We separately run the specification using 1-10
neighbors as the nearest neighbor designation and conduct Bayesian analysis to determine
the nearest neighbor specification which bests describes the data. Our analysis suggests that
the appropriate number is 8, although estimates are consistent when the nearest number is
6,7 or 9 as well.
Spatially lagged values are included by multiplying the own observation dependent and
independent variable vectors by a spatial weight matrix that represents the assumed spatial
connection between communities. For our variable of interest, the spatial lag of regulatory
levels, a weighted average of the regulatory levels in the closest 8 jurisdictions is included
as a dependent variable. If the coefficient on this variable is positive and significant, this is
evidence that the regulatory levels in surrounding jurisdictions influences the levels in the
5The code for this weight matrix comes from the script in Lesage’s Matlab toolbox
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observation. Beyond the presence of spatial dependence, this coefficient does not have any
numerical interpretation (LeSage and Pace, 2009).
The spatial Durbin model is particularly useful because it reduces the impact of omitted
variable bias when those omitted variables are spatially correlated (as we would expect
to occur when regulation is due to geographic constraints) (LeSage and Pace, 2009). A
spatial autoregressive model specification, in which a lag is only taken of the dependent
variable rather than all variables, is included as a robustness check. Additionally, we employ
regional fixed effects to account for regionally-specific attitudes toward regulation while also
controlling for the influence of shared geography, both of which may influence the level of
regulation.
The spatial durbin model takes the form:
v = α + ρWv +Xβ +WXθ + , isN(0, σ2I),
where v is the log of the WRLURI, X is a matrix of city characteristics and regional controls,
W is an nxn spatial weight matrix representing the neighbor relationship between cities and
ρ is the coefficient of the influence of neighboring regulatory levels.6 Following LeSage and
Pace (2009), the data generating process is then:
v = (In − ρW )−1(α +Xβ +WXθ + ) (1)
The spatial model allows us to calculate the direct, indirect, and total effects for each of
6For the local level specification we add 2 to every value of the index and 3 to every value of the MSA
level index to ensure all positive numbers.
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the independent variables. We can rewrite equation 1 as:
(In − ρW )v = Xβ +WXθ + α + , then
Let V (W ) = (In − ρW )−1 and
Sr = V (W )(In ∗ βr +Wθr), then
v =
k∑
r=1
Sr(W )xr + V (W )inα + V (W )
(2)
The direct effect is the average effect that a change in the independent variable of an ob-
servation has on its own dependent variable and can be describes as ∂vi
∂xi,r
= Sr(W )i,i. This
coefficient includes the initial impact of the change in an independent variable on its depen-
dent variable as well as feedback in the system. This feedback occurs when the change in the
dependent variable causes changes in the other dependent variables of the system through
the spatial weight matrix, which in turn feedback onto the initial dependent variable. The
indirect effect represents the average spatial spillover effect that a change in an independent
variable has on all other dependent variables, excluding its own dependent variable and can
be describes as ∂vi
∂xj,r
= Sr(W )i,j. The total effect is the sum of the direct and indirect effects.
We focus on the direct effects, although the indirect and total effects are available upon
request.7 The presence of a spatially dependent relationship with respect to regulation will
be evidences by a ρ coefficient that is positive and significant.
3.2 Data
The data on regulations is from the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (WR-
LURI) developed by Gyourko et al. (2008). The index is created from a 2005 nationwide
survey of towns and cities on local land use regulations. It uses responses from a question-
7For a complete discussion of the effects estimates, see LeSage and Pace (2009).
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naire designed to capture three aspects of the regulatory environment: (1) the number and
type of agencies involved in the process of zoning requests, (2) the current local regulation
rules and (3) the effects of the regulation on development costs and time delays. Gyourko
et al. (2008) also incorporate state-level regulatory action and policies, as well as a measure
of “community pressure” to adopt further regulation.
The information was used to create a final index comprised of eleven sub-indices, includ-
ing local political pressure, state political involvement, state court involvement, local zoning
approval, local project approval, local assembly, density restrictions, open space index, exac-
tions index, supply restrictions and approval delay. Gyourko et al. (2008) recommends use of
an index which combines all of these features because the measures are highly correlated with
one another. A cumulative score reflects the overall regulatory environment, with a lower
score implying less regulatory interference. The index is standardized so that the sample
mean is zero and the standard deviation is equal to one.8
The final data set incorporates responses from over 2,600 municipalities. We use 1970
values for most of the independent variables in order to avoid endogeneity (Glaeser and Ward,
2009). The 1970’s marked the beginning of a rapid expansion in the regulatory environment
that has persisted over time. These initial values of dependent variables have been found
to largely determine the levels of regulation seen today. Therefore, we exclude communities
from the Wharton data set for which the Census did not collected data for in 1970. We also
exclude communities that are not considered to be places at all for data collection purposes
and communities located in Hawaii and Alaska due to the spatial nature of our paper9. In
all, we have 2054 community observations that we use to test for the presence of spatial
dependence at the local level.
To apply the analysis at the metropolitan level, the Wharton data set provides at least
one community observation from 291 MSA’s. We use the metro weights in the Wharton data
set to calculate the weighted average of the WRLURI value of all the communities that are
8For a complete explanation of the creation of the index refer to Gyourko et al. (2008).
9The excluded communities are mostly town and township observations from PA, NJ, NY, WI, and MI
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located within an MSA to use as the MSA dependent variable. The communities that are
not in recognizable MSAs are excluded from the analysis, leaving us with 1902 communities.
The data for the independent variables are from the HUD State of the Cities Data Systems
web site and from the U.S. Census. In order to control for determinants of regulation
related to snob zoning (zoning to deter low-income residents), we include as independent
variables the percent of the population that are non-Hispanic whites, the percent of the
population that are immigrants, the percent of the 25 and over population that has at least
a Bachelor’s degree, median household income, and the percent of homes that are owner
occupied. Additionally, we include the log of land area, log of housing density and the
census region.
At the MSA level analysis we also include a measure of developable land from Saiz (2010).
This measure controls for determinants of zoning related to natural geographic determinants
such as mountains, bodies of water and other safety issue variables. Unfortunately, this
variable is not available at the local level analysis. For the local level analysis we rely on a
measure of “coastal watershed”, from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). Following Gyourko et al. (2008), we also include a variable that represents if the
community is a declining community. We calculate population growth for the community
between 1970 and 1980 and designate communities as declining if they are in the bottom
quartile of population growth over this time period. Variable means and standard deviations
can be found in Table 1.
We expect the WRLURI to be increasing in measures of snob zoning and geographic
constraint variables, and to be decreasing for declining communities. We expect the negative
relationship between regulation and declining communities because these communities may
be competing for businesses and consequently have less regulation and, additionally, are not
in danger of becoming crowded due to population growth. We also include regional fixed
effects that are given for the nine Census regions to account for regional variations in terms of
shared geography and also with respect to differences in regional attitudes toward regulation.
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Our excluded region is the Pacific and we expect that this region is associated with higher
levels of regulation, largely due to geographic considerations. As such, it is expected that
other regions are associated with relatively lower regulatory levels.
4 Results
4.1 Local Level Analysis
We run the specification with and without regional controls using a spatial Durbin model
(SDM), a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) and a simple OLS model. Results from all
three models under both specifications can be found in Table 2. The spatial Durbin model
specification without regional controls can be found in column 1 while the results with
inclusion of regional controls can be found in column 2. Similarly, the spatial autoregressive
model results can be found in columns 3 and 4 while the OLS estimates can be found in
columns 5 and 6.
Theory supports the use of the spatial Durbin model, although results are fairly similar in
terms of direction of influence, but not magnitude, for all three models. With respect to the
spatial Durbin model without regional controls, we find that higher values for the snob zoning
variables of immigrants, income, and whites are associated with higher levels of regulation.10
The effect of being classified as a declining city and percent owner occupied are negative,
but insignificant for this specification. Higher levels of housing density and land area are
both associated with lower levels of regulation. Although the effect of these two variables is
surprising, it is possible that housing density and land area are not completely exogenous to
the level of regulation. A higher level of regulation may result in lower housing densities in
some areas by design, while increased levels of regulation may discourage expansion, leading
to a decrease in land area. The associated effect of being on a coastal watershed is found to
10We restrict our discussion of results to relative magnitude and direction of influence due to the nature
of our dependent variable. Since the regulatory levels are measured with an index, interpreting the numeric
influence of a variable on an index is not particularly illuminating.
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have a positive and significant influence, as expected.
When regional effects are added, the majority of our control variables maintain the same
direction of influence but amend the level of significance for some variables. Land area,
percent white and percent immigrant are now statistically insignificant, while declining city
is still negative, but now significant. Percent owner occupied is now reported as positive,
rather than negative, but insignificant. Central regions, both north and south, as well as the
South Atlantic region have a statistically significant negative associated effect on regulatory
levels. Other regions, with the exception of New England, also suggest a negative influence
relative to the Pacific region, but the estimates are insignificant. The Pacific region engages
in very high levels of regulation so the negative estimated effect with respect to other regions
is not surprising. For both specifications, the spatial dependence coefficient, ρ, is positive
and significant. As expected, the strength of the spatial dependence is less when regional
controls are included. This difference when regional controls are included is likely due to the
fact that neighboring jurisdictions tend to have similar geographies which influence the level
of regulation.
We also consider the specification using the spatial autoregressive model. Relative to the
estimates obtained using the Durbin model, the associated effect of land area is reported
to be positive and significant when regional controls are employed. The magnitude and
significance of our variable of interest, ρ, remains positive and significant. Results obtained
when employing a simple OLS estimation are consistent with the spatial autoregressive
results in terms of direction of influence and level of significance.
These results imply that the level of regulation in one jurisdiction is strongly related to
the level of regulation in the neighboring district, even after controlling for regional influences
and shared geography. The large magnitude and statistical significance of spatial dependence
coefficient implies that the extent of competition between localities may be quite large.
Given this relationship, estimates obtained without accounting for spatial dependence, even
when regional influences and shared geography are accounted for, are going to be biased
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(LeSage and Pace, 2009). For example, being classified as a declining city and percent of
the population that is immigrants, have a much greater influence on regulatory levels in the
SDM specification than the OLS specification.
4.2 MSA Level Analysis
To analyze the effect of neighboring MSA regulatory levels, we specify nearest neighbors as
the ten closest MSAs and run the same specifications as in the local case. The estimates
obtained for all models and all specifications are reported in Table 3. We first consider
the spatial Durbin model estimates without regional controls. As expected, a city being
classified as declining is associated with lower levels of regulation while percent immigrant
is positive and significant significant. Percent immigrant, percent white and percent owner
occupied are positive, but insignificant. Departing from the estimates obtained from the
local specification, housing density is found to be positive, but insignificant while land area
is negative and insignificant.
Our spatial dependence coefficient remains positive and significant at the MSA level.
When we include regional controls, land area exerts a positive, but insignificant influence
on regulatory levels. As expected, the magnitude of spatial dependence is lower than the
specification without regional controls. The discrepancy between the two estimates suggests
that regional geography does influence regulatory levels, as found by Saiz (2010). Omitting
a control for this geographic influence makes spatial dependence appear more influential
than it is, while at the same time, omitting a spatial dependence variable makes other
considerations appear to have a different influence. All other variables report similar results
when regional controls are included. Regional variables are insignificant for all areas for the
SDM specification. New England, Mid Atlantic, East North Central and Mountain regions
report a positive influence, while the rest are negative and all are insignificant.
We separately run the specification including the land index developed by Saiz (2010)
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for the MSA level analysis.11 Estimates are nearly identical to the ones obtained using the
coastal variable as the geographic influence. However, the inclusion of the undevelopable
land index variable does lower the magnitude of influence the spatial dependence coefficient
has on regulatory levels, as expected. The Saiz (2010) variable is much more comprehensive
than a simple designation as a coastal area and is more likely to result in a better estimate
of the true spatial relationship, which remains positive and significant.
The results of a simple OLS and spatial autoregressive model specification yield similar
estimates that, in some cases, differ dramatically from the spatial Durbin model specification.
The spatial autoregressive model, consistent with the spatial Durbin estimation, yields a
positive and significant ρ coefficient in all specifications. Similar to the local level analysis,
the OLS specification reports a significantly smaller influence of the size of the immigrant
population and being a declining city than the SDM specification.
Ignoring the spatial dependence in this case would underestimate both the large degree
of snob zoning with respect to immigrants that appears to be taking place and also the
large influence of recent growth. The presence of a significant spatial relationship, even after
controlling for regional influences, implies that MSAs may indeed be in competition with
one another to either attract/keep homeowners (areas with high levels of regulation) or to
attract/keep renters and businesses (areas with low levels of regulation).
5 Conclusion
Land use regulations impose significant costs to the community in the form of higher cost of
doing business and higher cost of housing. It is thought that politicians may tend to increase
regulatory levels to maximize housing values to maximize homeowners’ welfare (Fischel,
2001). Largely excluded as an explanatory variable is the level of regulation in neighboring
jurisdictions. Politicians compete for votes and voters with politicians in close proximity
11The land index is not available at the local level so we do not report the results of the full specification.
These results are available upon request.
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(Tiebout, 1956), and consequently will account for regulatory levels in these communities.
We do indeed find evidence that regulatory levels are significantly influenced by the levels
of regulation in the surrounding jurisdictions. This is true at the local jurisdiction level and at
the aggregated MSA level. These results confirm previous findings by (Brueckner, 1998), but
extend the applicableness of his findings. We use over 2,000 community observations spread
over the contiguous 48 states compared to the previous analysis of a cluster of townships in
California. Additionally, by estimating the effects at the local level and the MSA level, we
are able to extend the scope at which it appears politicians are engaging in competition.
This spatial dependence may be problematic from a social welfare perspective. With
respect to regulatory levels, a neighboring jurisdiction adopting regulatory measures may
entice a politician to adopt similar regulatory measures. In some cases, this may result
in sub-optimal levels of regulation. If, for example, the purpose of the original regulatory
action was to engage in snob zoning, low-income residents are driven to reside in surrounding
jurisdictions. These jurisdictions adopt higher levels of regulation to avoid an influx of low-
income residents. As a result, both areas have higher levels of regulation, which may be costly
in terms of economic growth and construction costs, but the same proportion of low-income
residents.
Similarly, MSAs wishing to attract businesses may reduce regulatory levels to decrease
the cost of doing business. Neighboring MSAs engage in competition for these businesses
by adopting low levels as well. The result is that both areas have low regulation levels,
which may be detrimental to house prices without attracting new businesses. Our finding
of neighboring regulatory levels acting as a determinant of regulatory levels suggests that
policy analysts must account for the role that neighboring jurisdiction regulatory levels play
in explaining regulatory levels observed. Estimates of the determinants of regulation that
do not account for this relationship may be biased.
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Table 1: Variable Description
Local Sample MSA Sample
Variable Source Mean (Std. Dev) Mean (Std. Dev)
Log WRLURI Gyourko et al. (2008) 1.01 0.58
(0.34) (0.47)
Log Land Area Census 2.24 7.27
(1.20) (0.89)
Log Housing Density Author’s Calculation (HUD) 5.94 4.11
(1.13) (1.07)
Coastal Author’s Calculation (NOAA Database) 0.32 0.43
(0.47) (0.50)
Declining City Author’s Calculation (HUD) 0.25 0.25
(0.43) (0.43)
Median Income Census 8.24 7.43
(3.18) (1.59)
College Grad % Census 12.38 11.24
(8.83) (4.23)
Immigrant % Census 86.4 83.16
(17.63) (13.49)
White % Census 3.61 3.64
(4.02) (3.33)
Owner Occ % Census 64.27 61.2
(13.07) (6.96)
New England Census .12 .09
(.32) (.28)
Mid Atlantic Census .12 .12
(.32) (.32)
E North Central Census .20 .17
(.12) (.37)
W North Central Census .12 .08
(.32) (.28)
South Atlantic Census .12 .18
(.32) (.38)
E South Central Census .05 .05
(.22) (.23)
W South Central Census .10 .12
(.30) (.32)
Mountain Census .06 .07
(.24) (.26)
Pacific Census .11 .12
(.31) (.33)
Observations 2052 291
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Table 2: OLS Model Estimates, SDM and SAR Model Total Effect Estimates (Local Sample)
SDM SAR OLS
WRLURI
Log Land Area -0.198** -0.101 0.035 0.067** 0.037** 0.053***
(-2.46) (-1.45) (0.92) (2.28) (2.00) (3.05)
Log Housing Density -0.441*** -0.226*** -0.384*** -0.301*** -0.245*** -0.168***
(-5.16) (-2.98) (-7.49) (-6.92) (-11.03) (-7.42)
Coastal 0.538*** 0.255** 0.566*** 0.249*** 0.621*** 0.261***
(5.12) (2.47) (5.76) (2.79) (14.59) (5.30)
Declining City -0.145 -0.336* -0.069 -0.188** -0.038 -0.141***
(-0.85) (-1.82) (-0.74) (-2.52) (-0.81) (-3.08)
Median Income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000***
(4.45) (2.99) (3.58) (2.48) (5.28) (3.32)
College Grad % -0.002 0.010 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.011*** 0.013***
(-0.18) (1.21) (5.64) (6.58) (4.76) (6.46)
Immigrant % 0.095*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.029*** 0.054*** 0.024***
(5.88) (4.22) (5.03) (3.47) (10.36) (4.61)
White % 0.006** 0.000 0.004* -0.001 0.005*** -0.001
(2.14) (-0.02) (1.69) (-0.39) (3.89) (-0.75)
Owner Occ % -0.016** 0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.003
(-2.26) (0.70) (-1.13) (0.54) (-1.50) (1.49)
New England 0.203 -0.064 0.151*
(1.18) (-0.46) (1.90)
Mid Atlantic -0.112 0.067 -0.134*
(-0.69) (0.52) (-1.73)
E North Central -0.519*** -0.521*** -0.596***
(-3.66) (-4.04) (-7.98)
W North Central -0.819*** -0.967*** -1.001***
(-5.49) (-6.60) (-12.46)
South Atlantic -0.295** -0.498*** -0.499***
(-2.42) (-4.10) (-6.92)
E South Central -0.750*** -1.155*** -1.114***
(-4.11) (-6.33) (-11.59)
W South Central -0.818*** -1.063*** -1.003***
(-5.41) (-6.70) (-12.54)
Mountain -0.124 -0.478*** -0.428***
(-0.76) (-3.01) (-4.68)
Constant 0.834** 0.259 0.290* 0.602*** 0.199 0.667***
(0.34) (0.38) (0.19) (0.21) (0.88) (2.97)
rho 0.546*** 0.454*** 0.592*** 0.483***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
R-squared 0.387 0.453 0.315 0.409 0.318 0.423
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
With the exception of rho and the constant, t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
For rho and the constant, the standard deviation is reported in parentheses.
The spatial regressions are run using an 8 nearest neighbor weight matrix.
Results were calculated using James LeSage’s Econometrics Toolbox for MATLAB.
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Table 3: OLS Model Estimates and SDM and SAR Model Total Effect Estimates for the
MSA Sample
MSA SDM SAR OLS
WRLURI
Log Land Area -0.008 0.016 0.327** 0.235** 0.016 0.047
(-0.03) (0.05) (2.45) (2.19) (0.29) (0.89)
Log Housing Density 0.006 0.253 0.387*** 0.341*** 0.046 0.186***
(0.02) (0.73) (2.76) (2.64) (0.82) (3.16)
Coastal 0.172 0.172 0.158 0.043 0.429*** 0.233**
(0.52) (0.43) (0.74) (0.21) (4.42) (2.09)
Declining City -1.277** -1.421** -0.824*** -0.616*** -0.411*** -0.404***
(-2.26) (-2.29) (-3.10) (-2.77) (-3.66) (-3.71)
Median Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.12) (-0.13) (-0.49) (-0.86) (1.54) (-0.79)
College Grad % 0.006 0.007 0.051** 0.040** 0.024** 0.018*
(0.12) (0.13) (2.04) (2.07) (2.36) (1.88)
Immigrant % 0.197*** 0.156** 0.171*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 0.054***
(2.81) (2.33) (3.79) (3.22) (7.01) (3.16)
White % 0.009 0.010 0.021** 0.014* 0.019*** 0.008*
(0.59) (0.59) (2.25) (1.70) (5.10) (1.79)
Owner Occ % 0.027 0.017 0.022 0.020 -0.008 0.003
(0.83) (0.54) (1.24) (1.46) (-0.97) (0.41)
New England 0.298 0.098 0.421**
(0.49) (0.26) (2.14)
Mid Atlantic 0.194 -0.293 -0.204
(0.36) (-0.91) (-1.18)
E North Central 0.181 -0.473 -0.508***
(0.31) (-1.40) (-2.78)
W North Central -0.374 -1.103*** -0.877***
(-0.71) (-2.77) (-4.58)
South Atlantic -0.311 -0.468 -0.555***
(-0.74) (-1.58) (-3.56)
E South Central -0.653 -0.744* -0.783***
(-0.99) (-1.76) (-3.56)
W South Central -0.504 -0.730** -0.797***
(-1.09) (-2.06) (-4.44)
Mountain 0.566 -0.041 0.186
(0.94) (-0.12) (0.94)
Constant -1.709* -1.499 -2.590*** -2.364*** -2.591*** -1.790**
(1.29) (1.46) (0.50) (0.55) (-3.54) (-2.46)
rho 0.610*** 0.529*** 0.668*** 0.562***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
R-squared 0.456 0.528 0.417 0.492 0.417 0.417
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
With the exception of rho and the constant, t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
For rho and the constant, the standard deviation is reported in parentheses.
The spatial regressions are run using an 8 nearest neighbor weight matrix.
Results were calculated using James LeSage’s Econometrics Toolbox for MATLAB.
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Table 4: OLS Model Estimates and SDM and SAR Model Total Effect Estimates for the
MSA Sample W/Unavailable Land Index
MSA SDM SAR OLS
WRLURI
Log Land Area -0.027 -0.150 0.277** 0.194** -0.010 0.004
(-0.09) (-0.61) (2.18) (1.98) (-0.17) (0.08)
Log Housing Density 0.130 -0.048 0.368*** 0.325*** 0.060 0.173***
(0.49) (-0.16) (2.68) (2.66) (1.05) (2.84)
Declining City -1.145** -1.288** -0.882*** -0.568*** -0.481*** -0.440***
(-2.00) (-2.15) (-3.22) (-2.94) (-4.09) (-3.90)
Median Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000
(1.44) (0.95) (-0.09) (-0.67) (2.09) (0.27)
College Grad % 0.072 0.073 0.062** 0.046** 0.033*** 0.030***
(1.28) (1.40) (2.41) (2.39) (3.03) (2.83)
Immigrant % 0.162** 0.179** 0.160*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.057***
(2.00) (2.26) (3.22) (2.99) (6.28) (3.11)
White % 0.003 0.001 0.019** 0.012 0.012*** 0.004
(0.17) (0.05) (2.00) (1.63) (3.11) (0.91)
Owner Occ % 0.014 0.028 0.014 0.018 -0.009 0.004
(0.50) (1.03) (0.82) (1.43) (-1.12) (0.57)
Unavail Land Index 0.559 -0.934 0.352 -0.112 0.525** 0.042
(0.67) (-1.02) (0.79) (-0.30) (2.46) (0.19)
New England 0.349 0.013 0.378
(0.56) (0.03) (1.61)
Mid Atlantic 0.223 -0.473 -0.311*
(0.44) (-1.41) (-1.68)
E North Central -0.288 -0.667* -0.709***
(-0.60) (-1.95) (-3.92)
W North Central -0.726 -1.232*** -1.030***
(-1.40) (-3.02) (-5.31)
South Atlantic -0.046 -0.564* -0.581***
(-0.12) (-1.96) (-3.66)
E South Central -0.620 -0.890** -0.900***
(-1.13) (-2.13) (-4.20)
W South Central -0.586 -0.901** -0.923***
(-1.38) (-2.58) (-5.14)
Mountain -0.115 -0.181 -0.032
(-0.24) (-0.60) (-0.17)
Constant -1.957* -1.492 -2.488*** -2.312*** -2.078*** -1.415*
(1.44) (1.53) (0.50) (0.54) (-2.79) (-1.97)
rho 0.561*** 0.430*** 0.647*** 0.509***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
R-squared 0.418 0.505 0.384 0.460 0.348 0.488
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
With the exception of rho and the constant, t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
For rho and the constant, the standard deviation is reported in parentheses.
The spatial regressions are run using an 8 nearest neighbor weight matrix.
Results were calculated using James LeSage’s Econometrics Toolbox for MATLAB.
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